University of California, Hastings College of the Law

UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Opinions

The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection

4-17-1945

Viner v. Untrecht
Roger J. Traynor

Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions
Recommended Citation
Roger J. Traynor, Viner v. Untrecht (1945).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions/183

This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Opinions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.

-..

,:."

.... ".

7074-27

7 s oS-l>

[L. A. No. 18907. In Bank. Apr. 17, 1945.]

BETTY RUTH L. VINER et at, Respondents, v. MARY
.
UNTRECHT, Appellant.
.
[1] Appeal- Questions of Law and Fact - Extent of Power of
Conn.-Where a judgment is attacked on the ground that it is
Dot 8upported, the power of the appellate court. ends when it

KeK. Dig. Beferences: [1] Appeal and Error, § 1285; [2] Trusts,
§ 129; [3] Trusts, § 128; [4] Trusts, § 106; [5-7] Trusts, § 117;
[8] Trusts, 195; [9] Trusts, § 287; [10] Innkeepers, 17(2); [11]
Appeal and Error, § 1237; [12] Costs, § 32; Damages, 149; [13]
Trover and Conversion, i 45; [14] D~ea, IlSCL
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once determines that there is substantial evidence which will
support the conclusions of the trial court.
[2] Trusts-Resulting Trusts-Evidence"':::"Review. - Whether the
evidence to prove the existence of a resulting trust is clear,
satisfactory and convincing is primarily a question for the
trial court to determine, and if there is substantial evidence to
suppOrt its .conclusion, the determination is not open to review
on appeal. Likewise, in such cases the credibility and weight
of the evidence are exclusively for the trial court.
[Sa, Sb] lei. - Resulting Trusts....::..Evidence--Sufficiency.-Findings
that defendant advanced money to plaintiff to enable plaintiff
to acquire property, took title to secure a loan and held the
property under a resulting trust, were sustained by defendant's admissions in a divorce action; by a statement to her
sister that the property belonged to plaintiff; by evidence that
title was taken in defendant's name because the grantor
declined to convey to plaintiff; by evidence that defendant
never claimed ownership when she lived on the premises prior
to her written repudiation of the lending agreement; and by
the language of the reputation itself.
[4] ld. - Resulting Trusts - Furnishing Oonsideration for Purchase.-Where the purchase price of real property is paid by
one person and the title is taken in the name of another, a
reSUlting trust arises in favor of the payor. (Civ. Code, § 853.)
[5] ld.-Resulting Trusts-Furnishing Oonsidera.tion for Purchase
-Loan by Grantee. - To constitute a resulting trust when
consideration is furnished for the purchase of. real property.
it is not always necessary that payment of the purchase price
be made by the claimant of the beneficial interest. The payment may be made by the transferee whell the money paid
constitutes a loan from the transferee to the claimant.
[6] Id.-ResultingTrusts-Furnishing Oonsideration for Purchase
-Loan by Grantee-Loan of Oredit.-A resulting trust is not
prevented by the transferee's assumption of an obligation to
the vendor or transferor to pay the purchase price, where the
claimant is obligated to reimburse the transferee. In such a
ease there is loan of credit by the transferee to the claimant.
(]?isapproving of statement in Lincoln v. OhamberZain, 61 Cal.
App. 399,.214 P. 1013, that the money must be actually paid
by the claimant "at or before the execution of the convey.
ance.")
[7] ld.-B.esul\ing Trusts-Furnishing OODSidera.tion for Purchase
-LOa.n 1»7 Gra.ntee.-A loan of money by the grantee to enable the borrower to purchase the property raises an impliec1

[4] See 15 Oa.Uur. 178.
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promise by the borrower to repay the loan. and no express
promise is necessary to constitute a resulting trust.
[8] ld.-Resulting Trusts-Effect of Oral Agreement.-A resulting
trust is not prevented from arising by the existence of an unenforceable oral agreement that the transferee of the property
is to hold it in trust for the claiii11tnt.
[9] ld. - Enforcement - Actions::':"'Conditions Precedent-Tender.
-In an action to enforce ·-a resulting trust against a, lender
who advanced money for the purchase of real property, title
to which was taken in the lender's name, it was not a necessary
eondition precedent for the beneficiary to tender the borrowed
money, where the lender had declined to render a statement
and had repudiated the loan agreement.
[10] lnnkeepers-Evidence-Sufficiency.-In an action to enforce
a resulting trust, the evidence supported a finding that the
lender was not a boarding-house keeper so as to be entitled to
a lien on personal property on the premises, and was not the
owner of the chattels, where she was present at a conversation
when an agent of the borrower was employed to operate the
premises, and where she neither brought any of said personalty on the premises nor made a payment on that which was
purchased.
[l1J Appeal- Questions of Law and Fact - Oredibility of Witnesses. - An appellate court cannot retry the comparative
veracity or accuracy of witnesses on matters pertaining to the
amount due a party.
[12] Costs-Items Allowable-Attorney's Fees: Damages-Attorney's Fees.-Generally, fees paid to attorneys are not recoverable from the opposing party either as costs, damages or otherwise, in the absence of express statutory or contractual
authority.
[13J Trover-Damages-Attorney's Fees.-Attorney's fees are not
recoverable under Civ. Code, § 3336, declaring that the detriment caused by the wrongful conversion of personal property
is presumed to be "a fair compensation for the time and
money properly expended in pursuit of the property."
[14] Damages-Exemplary Damages-Attorney's Fees.-It is improper to include attorney's fees as a part of exemplary dam[8] Rights of parties under oral agreement to buy land for another, note,'42 A.L.R. 10, 55. See, also, 12 Cal.Jur. 886; 25 Cal.
Jur. 170, 179.
[12] See "7 Cal.Jur. 286; 8 Cal.Jur. 801; 24 Cal.Jur. 1055; 14
Am.Jur. 38; 15 Am.Jur. 550.
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ages, and an award of such fees as such cannot be upheld r.s
constituting an award of punitive damages.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Conrt of
Los Angeles County. Roy V. Rhodes, Judge. Modified and
affirmed.
Action to enforce a resulting trust. Judgment for plaintiffs modified and affirmed without costs on appeal.
Arthur E. Briggs and J. B. Mandel for Appellant.
S. L. Kurland and W. L. Pollard for Respondents.

)

CARTER, J.-We have examined the record in this case
and adopt the decision of the District Court of Appeal of
the Second Appellate District, Division Two, prepared by
:Mr. Presiding Justice Moore, with the omissions, alterations
and additions hereinafter appearing:
"This action was brought to enforce a resulting trust. All
of the material allegations of the complaint were found to
be true and those of the cross-complaint substantially contrary to the complaint were found to be untrue. Also, the
court found that defendant's maintenance of her claims of
ownership of the realty and of her claims of lien upon certain movables of plaintiffs was in bad faith by reason of
which plaintiffs were awarded ••• attorney's fees in the
sum of $1,000. From the ensuing judgment defendant has
brought this appeal upon seven grounds [most of] which
may be summed up in one phrase: Insufficiency of the evidence to support the findings and the judgment.
"Prior to Noyember 15, 1940, plaintiff, Betty Ruth L.
Viner, herein at times referred to as Ruth. was president of
the Business Women's Association, a nonprofit California
corporation. She and her corporation were associated with
the Western States University, also a nonprofit California
corporation. The two corporations having interests in the
several properties involved in this action joined with Mrs.
Viner as plaintiffs to establish their respective claims against
a common adversary. Inasmuch as the right of each of the
plaintiffs as against one another is immaterial to a decision,
DO effort will be made to keep distinct their respective interests in so far as they relate to defendant.
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"Prior to November 1, 1940, Ruth had become associated
with defendant Mary Untrecht. About that date, having investigated and negotiated for the acquisition of a hou~e on
behalf of the association, Ruth decided to undertake the purchase of a fourteen-room residence, herein referred to ;;~
'La Brea House,' for the sum of $6,300, on terms, 10 per N'nt
payable in cash, the balance in deferred payments. In order
to effect such purchase. Ruth, on behalf of the association,
agreed with Mary that if the latter would lend the aS80c:a1ion
as much 8..'1 $1,500 in order to consummate the transaction,
to make certain improvements, to buy certain furnishings b.nd
to pay the accrued taxes and assessments, she should be repaid
her advances with interest at 7 per cent per annum compounded; receive instructions in comptometry and bookkeeping; and have the use of a residential room free of charge.
As security for the repayment of her loan, it was agreed that
the title to the property should be vested in defendant. Arrangements for the purchase were concluded on Jannary 3,
1941, when Mary deposited in the escrow the sum of $715,
and she was named grantee in the conveyance of La Brea
house. The association installed it.s furniture and furnishinr-s,
leased to Mrs. Viner certain residential rooms, which lease
was ratified by [defendant], and, pursuant to the loan agreement had Mary occupy the room she had selected for herself.
Ruth moved her furniture into the house, and both women
continued to reside there until the repudiation of the loan contract by Mary. In the following month [defendant) advanced
an additional $200 to the association and thereafter maue
other payment..'l on account of the property.
"Simultaneously with the foregoing events the association
leased certain space in the building to the University for the
storage of its 165 law books, comptometer and other equip"
ment, and this tenant agreed to carry out the association's contract with [defendant) by giving her the promised technical
training. For fifteen months Mary continued to reside in the
house and to receive instructions from the University which
tuition was of the reasonable value of $300. After the occupancy of the house by the two women Ruth made practically
all of the installment payments on the purchase price, paid
the taxes and assessments, the uti1ities and expense of operation. This continued until Januar,y 3, 1942, when the asso-
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eiation extended Ruth's lease for another year in consideration of her continuing the same payments. This she did until
July 15, 1942.
"On July 4, 1942 [defendant) informed the association
that she was the owner, demanded possession of the property;
declared the association had no interest therein, and repudiated all agreements. theretofore made with Ruth. The association requested. a statement of its indebtedness on account
of moneys advanced by l\:t:ary but that lady denied the existence of any such indebtedness. Following her oral and written demands for possession of the realty, Mary asserted a
lodging-house lien upon the furniture and furnishings of
Ruth and of the association and on September 10th she posted
notice of sale of such effects pursuant to section 1861, Civil
Code, for the purpose of satisfying her demand for moneys
advanced in the sum of $3,142. The total of all moneys advanced by Mary in connection with the purchase and improvement of the property was $1,679.62. Besides her own occupancy, after the repudiation, Mary received net rentals as income from the house [in the amount of] $623.55. The University owns the movables it had placed in the house under its
lease from the association. Although Mary had no interest in
them she took them away and held them without any claim of
right. Their value is $3,000. That corporation and Ruth were
both required to employ counsel to effect a recovery and the
reasonable value of such service to each of them is· the sum
of $500.
"The foregoing facts having been found to be true the
[trial court concluded as follows] :
"(1) At all times the association was the equitable owner
of La Brea house. (2) Defendant held title for the association, subject to her lien for advances; but (3) she had no right
to the possession of the property to the exclusion of [plaint5ff.s 1. (4) By virtue of their leases, Ruth and the University
were entitled to occupy certain rooms which they entered as
tenants of the association and occupied February 1, 1941;
(5) neither was Mary a boarding-house keeper, nor was Ruth
her guest, but on the contrary, (6) she was herself a mere
lodger in the house. (7) She had no lien upon, claim to, or
legal interest in, the law books and bookkeeping machines
taken by her from the University or to any of the chattels
claimed by Ruth, therefore Mar~' shonld pay to Ruth and the
University the $1,000 counsel fees and•••• (9) The associa-
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tion is entitled to all moneys heretofore collected as rentals
on the La Brea house and to. an accounting of all moneys
paid her as rentals therefor after July 4, 1942, besides the'
$623.55. she accounted for' prior to judgment.
[1] "It is fundamental that where a judgment is attacked
on the ground that it is not supported, the power of the appellate court ends when it shall once have determined that
there is substantial evidence which will support the conrlusions of the trial court." (See Stromerson v. Averill, 22 Cal.
2d 808 [141 P.2d 732]; Watson v. Poore, 18 Ca1.2d 302 [115 P.
2d 478].) [2] And that rule is applicable where the action
is one to enforce a resulting. truSt. Whether the evidence to
prove the existence of the trust is clear, satisfactory and convincing "is primarily a question for the trial court to determine, and if there is substantial evidence to support its conclusion, the determination is not open to review on appeal."
(Stromerson v. Averill, supra, at p. 815. See, also, Beeler, v.
American Trust Co., 24 Ca1.2d 1 [147 P.2d 583].) Likewise,
in such cases the credibility and weight of the evidence are
exclusively for the trial court. (Watson v. Poore, supra;
Strornerson v. Aven'll, supra.)
[3a] "The proof found to support the findings and judgment consists of two eases, to wit: (1) the declarations and
affidavits of [defendant] and (2) the testimony of [plaintiffs]
and their witnesses. Defendant testified that she purchased
the La Brea home for herself and that the association was
never mentioned in reference to the property. However, on
October 29, 1940, she executed an affidavit to be filed in her
divorce action in the superior court in which she averred
that her sole possession was a $200 interest in a life insurance
policy. On June 19. 1941, six months after taking title to the
La Brea property she filed her verified amended complaint
in the same action alleging that she was indigent. . . . In the
verified divorce pleading she alleged that she was so ill from
October, 1940, to June, 1941, that she was unable to do any
work. In the present action she alleged under oath (1) that
during the same period she acted as secretary; office attendant,
and instructor for the association in its downtown office and
that such services were worth $1,540; and (2) that during
the same period she was acting as housekeeper for [plaintiffs]
and did an 'of the work for the roomers and for [plaintiffs]
in the upkeep of the fourteen-room house with its siX bed-
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rooms, and that such services were reasonably worth $1,690.
"The testimony of Mrs. Viner established that she located
the La Brea house as a desirable property and that Mary ac('ompanied her to visit the premises. They had many meetings
at which the house was shown to certain members of the association and Mary finillly agreed to lend to the association funds
not to exceed $1';500 in order to complete the purchase and
repairs. Ruth conducted all negotiations; dictated all lette1'8
for Mary's signature and told the agent of the grantor that
the title would be taken in the name of [defendant] in order
to comply with the requirements of the bank which declined
to convey to an eleemosynary corporation. Mary was present
at all of the conferences had with the seller or its agent; was
present at the time the escrow was opened; advanced $715
for the down payment and other outlays and later gave Ruth
$200 as a part of the sums she had promised to advance. At
the time the escrow was opened Mary stated to her that she
hesitated to take title to the property in her own name by
reason of the pendency of her divorce action.
"The witness Ware, licensed real estate broker, testified
that, in his presence at about the time the escrow was opened,
[defendant] stated that they could not buy the property under
the· name of the association on account of its credit standing
and that it was taken by her in trust for the association to be
conveyed to it at the proper time. The witness Kohan, sister
of Ruth, established that in the summer of 1942 Mary told
her that the property belonged to the association; that she
desired to collect the moneys she had loaned to make the purchase; that it could be sold at a profit if she and Ruth could
share in it; that if it were not sold 'she would use any means
possible to make her sell it so she could get her loan therefrom.' One Shoup made a oontract for the painting of the
house with Mrs. Viner and Mrs. Snyder, president and secretary of the association. He testified that he never discussed
the painting with [defendant] during the several weeks he
was there employed. . . . When defendant gave notice of her
repudiation her language was that 'all agreements between
you and Mrs. Untrecht are hereby terminated and cancelled.'
From such language of her counsel, in the light of other proof,
it is a reasonable inference that defendant acknowledged
that she had. made a contract with Mrs. Viner on terms
advantageous to the latter••••"
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From the forcgoing it is apparent that we have an agreemcnt between plaintiffs and defendant under which the latter
agreed to lend money to the former for t.he purchase of real
property, the title to which was to be taken in the name of
defendant who was to hold it in trust for plaintiffs. Thereafter, and pursuant to that agreement, the loan was made by
defendant to plaintiffs and as a part of the same transaction
the money representing the loan was paid by defendant to the
vendor of the property 1'8.ther than to plaintiffs, and defendant became obligated to make the balance of the payments
on the property. The property was accordingly conveyed to
defendant. The rules of law applicable to those facts are
clear. [4] In the ordinary case a resulting trust arises in
favor of the payor of the purchase price of the property
where the purchase price is paid by one person and the title
is taken in the name of another (Civ. Code, § 853: 25 Cal.Jur.
178.) [15] It is not always necessary that the payment of
the purchase price be made by the claimant of the beneficial
int.ere.<;t. It may be made by the transferee when it constitutes a loan from the transferee to the claimant. (Watson
v. Poore, ~upra; Millard v. Hathaway, 27 Cal. 119: Walton
v. Karnes, 67 Cal. 255 [7 P. 676]; Ward v. Matthews, 73 Cal.
13 (14 P. 604]; Hellman v. Messmer, 75 Cal. 166 r16 P. 766];
White v. Oostigan, 138 Cal. 564 (72 P. 178]; Breitenbucher
v. Oppenheim, 160 Cal. 98 rU6 P. 551: Brown v. Spencer,
163 Cal. 589 (126 P. 4931; O'Rourke v. Skellinger, 169 Cal.
270 [146P. 633): Webb v. Vercoe, 201 Cal. 754 [258 P. 1099,
54 A.L.R. 1200); Schumacher v. lAngford, 20 Cal.App. 61
[127 P. 10571; Orozier v. Soquel, 101 Cal.App. 402 [281 P.
698]; Penziner v. West American Finance 00., 133 Cal.App.
578 [24 P.2d 501); see Stromerson v. Avert'll, supra; Hidden
v. Jordan, 21 Cal. 92; Sandfoss v. Jones, 35 Cal. 481: 0'0011.nor v. lrvine, 74 Cal. 435 [16 P. 236]; Hellman v. Messmer,
SUl)ra; Rest., Trust, § 448.) [6] Nor is a resulting trust
prevented by an a.'lSumption by the t1'8.nsferee of an obligation
to the vendor or transferor to pay the purchase price, where ...
the claimant is obligated to reimburse the transferee. In such
a case there is loan of credit by the t1'8.nsferee to the claimant
(Watson v. Poore, supra; see Stromerson v. Averill, S'Upra;
Rest., Trusts, § 456, comment d). The ease of Lincoln v.
ChambcT1ain, 61 Cal.App. 399 [214 P. 1013], is distinguishable inasmuch as there was no loan by the transferee in that
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case to the claimant at or prior to the time of the transaction.
After the transaction the claimant promised •.to pay for the
property. The statement therein that: " . • • it must be
shown that the party setting up thE." trust paid the money
either at or before the execution of t1:e conve~·ance and as a
part of the original transaction of purchase," is out of harmony with the foregoing authorities and must be disapproved
in so far as it requires that the money be actually paid by
the claimant "at or before the execution of the conveyance."
[7] Contrary to defendant's contention it is not necessary
that there be an express agreement by the elaimant to repay
the loan. An agreement to repay may be implied. (Brown
v. Spencer, supra; Couts v. Winston, 153 Cal 686 [96 P.
357).) Of course, the trustee of th.e resulting trust holds
the legal title as security for the loan. (Watson v. Poore,
supra; Stromerson v. Averill, supra.)
[8] Defendant contendS that there can be no resulting
trust because there was an express agreement between the
parties that defendant would make the loan and hold title in
trust for plaintiffs. Where the elements of a resulting trust
are present, the fact that transferee and payor of the purchase
price, and the claimant, made an oral agreement that the
former was to hold the property in trust for the latter which
was unenforceable under the statute of frauds or otherwise,
does not prevent a resulting trust from arising. Indeed, such
agreement supports the inference or presumption that the
payor did not intend that the transferee should have the beneficial interest. (See Bayles v. Baxter, 22 Cal. 575; Breitenbucher v. Oppenheim, 160 Cal. 98 [116 P. 55]; Stromerson
v. Aven1l, IUpra; Watson v. Poore, supra; Gerety v. O'Sheehan, 9 Cal.App. 447 [99 P. 545]; Pavlovich v. Pavlovich, 22
Cal.App. 500 [135 P. 303]; Root v. Kuhn, 51 CalApp. 600
[197 P. 150]; Juranek v. Juranek, 29 Cal.App.2d 276 [84
P.2d 195]; Rest., Trust, § 441, comment j; 12 Mich.L.Rev.
427; 42 A.L.R. 10, 55.)
[OJ The trust is not defeated by the failure of the association to tender the borrowed moneys.
"Mary's declination to render a statement and her repudiation of the loan agreement and the trust rendered further
tenders idle·and unnecessary (Penziner v. West American
Finance Co., 133 CalApp. 578, 586 [24 P.2d 501]).
"No other equitable ground is alleged or proved that would
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justify a judicial defeat of the trust relationship. [Defendant] was free to make the loan. She received a va,Juable
consideration for it. She continued to enjoy the relationship
for eighteen months at the expiration of which she was free
to enforce her lien for the moneys she had advanced.
[3b] "It is thus demonstrated that the findings with
reference to the La Brea property find abundant and subtial support in the record leaving this court without power
to alter the conclusions derived by the court below."
In the light of the law above set forth none of the authorities cited by defendant is controlling in the instant case.
[10] "The evidence is equally abundant to support the
findings that the University owns the personal property which
it claimed, that Ruth was not a guest of Mary; that [defendant] is not the owner of the chattels used by the association
in the La Brea house and that the only moneys advanced by
Mary to the association were those used for the purchase and
for taxes and improvement of the property. [Defendant] wit·
nessed the conversation whereby Ruth was employed to operate the house. The latter engaged a number of employees to
do the menial tasks from February, 1941, till May, 1942. By
her own testimony and that of Mrs. Munson, Mrs. Schneider
and Miss Yaryan, Ruth established that Mary neither brought
any furniture iilto the house nor made a payment on that
which was purchased, and that she did no work either as a
domestic or as instructor for [plaintiffs]. Because of such
proof and its acceptance by the court, [defendant's] asserted
claims of a lien as an innkeeper upon the personal property
in the La Brea house are utterly without right (Fox v. Windermere Hotel A. Co., 30 Cal.App. 162 [157 P. 820]) . . . ."
[11] Defendant "complains that the amount of her award
should have been $2,489.31 instead of $1,679.62, allowed by
the judgment. In support of this she cites her own testimony
with reference to a payment she made to the painter, the
eon stant tendency of Mrs. Viner to exaggerate, and the misstatement of Exhibit 39. For reasons heretofore recited we
cannot retry the comparative veracity or accuracy of tlie witnesses. On the contrary, the findings and decision determined that Mary is entitled to a total of $1,679.62, the full
amount of her· loans, but that she is indebted to [plaintiffsl
for net rentals collected, $623.55; . . . counsel fees, $1,000,
[and] costs in the sum of $208.35."
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The court reserved the right to a further accounting
when defendant had complied with the decree.
The plaintiffs alleged that defendant without right or claim
of right has willfully failed to return the personal property
for the purpose of harassing them and that they are entitled
to $1,000 punitive damages and $1,000 attorney's fees expended in pursuit of that property. 'l'he court found the allegation true but did not award punitive damages, rather it
found that plaintiffli had incurred attorney's fees in the sum
of $1,000 in pursuit of the property and awarded that amount.
[12] Generally, fees paid to attorneys are not recoverable
from the opposing party either as costs, damages or otherwise
in the absence of express statutory or contractual authority.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1021; 7 Cal.Jur. 286-288; 8 Cal.Jur. 801802; 24 Cal.Jur. 1055-1056.) [13] Plaintiffs rely upon section 3336 of the Civil Code declaring the detriment caused
by the wrongful conversion of personal property is presumed
to be "a fair compensation for the time and money properly
expended in pursuit of the property." Attorney's fees are
not recoverable under that section. (Hays v. Windsor, 130
Cal. 230 [62 P. 395]; W. R. Bradshaw & Co. v. Eggers, 27
Cal.App. 132 [148 P. 961); Nicholls v. Mapes, 1 Cal.App.
349 [82 P. 265]; see Murphy v. Mulgrew, 102 Cal. 547 (36 P.
857, 41 Am.St.Rep. 200]; Spooner v. Cady, 5 Cal.Unrep. 357
[44 P. 1018]; Greenbaum v. Martinez, 86 Cal. 459 [25 P. 12];
Martland v. Bekins Van & Storage Co., 19 Cal.App. 283 [125
P. 759]; Drinkhouse v. Van Ness, 202 Cal. 359 [260 P. 8691 ;
Harris v. Smith, 132 Cal. 316 [64 P. 409]; Holm v. Davis,
8 Cal.App.2d 328 r47 P.2d 537].)
[14] Plaintiffs assert that the allegations in their complaint and statements in the findings concerning attorney's
fees should be ignored or interpreted as really referring to
punitive damage. While it is true that the court found the
detention of plaintiff's property was without claim of right
and for the purpose of harassing plaintiffs, yet no punitive
damages are awarded and the findings unequivocally made an
award of attorney's fees rather than punitive damages. For
illustration, with reference to plaintiff Western States University, the court found that it "has been required to employ
••. attorneys at law, ..• as its attorneys in order to secure
a return of said property, and has incurred an attorneys' fee
in the sum of $500.00 therefore to said attorneys, and is en-
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titled to judgment in said sum, which said sum is a reasonable
sum, therefor."
.
We find no room for interpretation in the matter. Moreover, it is improper to include attorney's fees as a part of
exemplary damages. (Howell v. Scoggins, 48 Cal. 355; Falk
v. Waterman,49 Cal. 224.) Accordingly, the judgment should
be modified by striking therefrom the item of $500 for attor'ney's fees awarded each of the plaintiffs, and as so modified,
the judgment is affirmed. Neither party to recover costs on
this appeal.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., and
Spence, J., concurred.
TRAYNOR, J.-I concur. My views with respect to the
scope of appellate review in eases where "clear and convincing evidence" is required are set forth in my dissenting opinions in Stromerson v. Averill, 22 Cal.2d 808, 817 [141 P.2d
732], and Beeler v. A.meric(m Trust Co., 24 Ca1.2d 1.29 [147
P.2d 583]. These views remain unchanged, but the rule announced in those cases now governs the scope of appellate
review in this state.
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